Complicity is an uncanny moral muddle. It is a state of our moral conditioning where we become implicated in others’ wrongdoing. At its core, complicity refers to a form of morally problematic involvement that is neither direct nor designed but fluid, fractured, and often fungible. Allegations of complicity may take different forms depending on how one is associated with the wrongdoer or the wrongdoing: from clear causal contribution to seemingly negligible association, from shared identity to shared attitudes, from mere knowledge to silent acquiescence, with many gradations in between. Understanding complicity, therefore, requires a careful examination of all the features and factors that shape one's moral position.

This workshop seeks to unravel the core of complicity by raising crucial conceptual issues from the point of view of ethical theory, philosophy of action, moral and political philosophy, and social ontology. Moving beyond the standard legal framework, where it has received comparatively sustained attention, the workshop aims to engage philosophically with a set of select areas that include, but are not limited to, the following-

Complicity and Collective Responsibility: Complicity often requires us to acknowledge moral responsibility. It operates at a level that transcends the conventional Kantian principle that ‘ought implies can’, a principle widely regarded as foundational to moral responsibility. Many large-scale harms, such as political and institutional wrongdoing, digital and online hate campaigns, global sweatshops, coercive corporate supply chains, the gender pay gap, environmental degradation and authoritarian oppression, do not pinpoint any plain or primary wrongdoer. Nevertheless, the issue of complicity arises when individuals benefit from the prevailing unjust structures. How should we interpret moral responsibility in contexts where individuals’ agential control is limited and compromised? Does the attribution of collective responsibility somehow absolve the individual wrongdoers, or is it the case that it adds an additional layer of responsibility beyond what one ought to bear given one’s contribution?

Historical and Structural Injustice: When we inherit benefits or burdens from past wrongs, our appeals to justice stretch backwards through time. Inequalities and disparities in contemporary wealth, intellectual power, and cultural capital can often be traced directly to colonialism, slavery, and exploitation and domination of other forms. Institutional racism comes as a legacy of discrimination and segregation. Chauvinism, sexism, favouritism, and partisanship endure in part because of entrenched historical injustices. How far back should this tracing of the causal chain go? At what point does it become too distant to rationalise present-day obligation? And what obligations, if any, do such cases of complicity create?

Moral Psychology of Complicity: The social critiques that highlight complicity often defy established legal and moral categories. Feelings of complicity may come from our perceived entanglement, shared social space, or compromised integrity. It may also arise from how we tend to see each other in relation to a wrongdoing. This forces us to reconcile ourselves to the fact that our moral life is not as individualistic as we are often led to believe. Our actions and omissions of doubtful nature are interwoven with those of others, generating what has been termed ‘metaphysical guilt’. How, then, is complicity related to the feelings of guilt, shame and remorse? What conceptual connections should be drawn between moral responsibility and these affective responses?

The aim of this workshop is to raise and respond to some of these questions through an interdisciplinary approach. We invite participation from people who are trained or interested in philosophy, political theory, law, gender studies, sociology and cultural studies. Our purpose is to offer an informed platform for dialogue and discussion among speakers and participants through a set of focused deliberations. This workshop will bring together three groups—experts in the field, doctoral students in relevant areas, and scholars keenly interested in the humanities and social sciences.

This two-day reflective exercise has three central aims: (1) to probe the strengths and weaknesses of various existing accounts of complicity, (2) to provide a stage for developing certain hybrid and integrative explanations, and (3) to broaden our understanding of the predicaments of today’s moral life.